Security.gr » Sea

Vice Admiral David H. Buss, US Navy

adminsecurity — Sat, 12 May 2012 16:44:07 +0000

Vice Admiral Buss, a native of Lancaster, Pa.,
graduated with distinction from the United States
Naval Academy in 1978. He was designated a
naval flight officer in 1979 and completed initial
training in the venerable A-6 Intruder later that
year.
Flying assignments at sea include Attack
Squadron 65 embarked in USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) in the early 1980s
and Attack Squadron 36 embarked in USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) during
Operation Desert Storm. He commanded Attack Squadron 34, The Blue Blasters,
embarked in USS George Washington (CVN 73) while conducting operations in
Bosnia and Iraq. The Blasters were one of the Navy’s last A-6 squadrons. Buss also
served at sea as flag lieutenant for commander, Carrier Group 8 embarked in USS
Nimitz (CVN 68).
Following Nuclear Power training, Buss served at sea as executive officer in
Nimitz. He commanded USS Sacramento (AOE 1) during the opening stages of
Operation Enduring Freedom following the terrorist attacks on 9/11. Buss
commanded USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) from 2003 through 2006, deploying to
the Western Pacific in support of 7th Fleet operations.
Shore assignments include tours as a Fleet Replacement Squadron instructor
with Attack Squadron 42 and as the readiness officer with Medium Attack Wing
One. He completed his initial joint duty assignment at the Joint Warfighting Center,
Hurlburt Field, Fla. Buss also served as assistant chief of staff,
Readiness/Requirements (N8) for commander, Naval Air Forces, in San Diego, Calif.
As a flag officer, Buss served on the OPNAV staff as well as serving for 14
months in Baghdad as director, Strategy/Plans/Assessments (J-5) for Gen. David
Petraeus and Gen. Ray Odierno.
Buss commanded Carrier Strike Group 12/Enterprise Carrier Strike Group,
returning Enterprise (CVN 65) and group to the fleet following more than two years
in maintenance, and he recently served as Director, Naval Warfare Integration
Group (N00X) for CNO.Personal awards include the Legion of Merit (5 awards), Distinguished Flying
Cross (with Combat V), Bronze Star Medal, and Air Medal (5 individual, 4
strike/flight awards). He was the recipient of the 1991 East Coast Naval Flight
Officer of the Year and 1991 Intruder of Year awards.

’Delivering Maritime Security in Global Partnership: Identify Cooperative Strategies for Future Maritime Security Engagement”

adminsecurity — Sat, 12 May 2012 16:29:00 +0000

Press_Release_el

PRESS RELEASE
Will the vulnerabilities of the Global Maritime Commons continue to be exploited?
How will this impact world security?
Maritime Security Conference 2012 contributes to global crisis management in maritime
environments.
Maritime insecurity in one part of the world has historically caused significant economic and security
impacts to the rest of the world. If piracy in The Gulf of Guinea or Southeast Asia’s Straits of Malacca
rose to the current level of Somalia’s Indian Ocean coast, there would be market shock around the world.
The Maritime Security Conference 2012 in Halifax, Canada, seeks to gather those leaders and thinkers
engaged in responding to these threats and other global challenges, and to develop the optimal,
cooperative strategies necessary to solve them.
Last year‘s successful and internationally acclaimed Maritime Security Conference in Kiel, Germany,
produced a broad spectrum of findings. The common understanding that the political will of the
international community is a prerequisite to a comprehensive maritime approach for dealing with multiple
threats in the maritime environment is at the core of those findings. In this context, the Maritime Security
Conference 2012 provides an exceptional working and networking platform for national, international,
governmental and non-governmental organizations, military entities and leading experts to further
examine the essential demands and activities required to achieve and enhance maritime security through
global cooperation.
Under the theme ”Delivering Maritime Security in Global Partnership: Identify Cooperative Strategies for
Future Maritime Security Engagement”, the Maritime Security Conference 2012 will take place at the
Westin Nova Scotian Hotel, Halifax, Canada, from 4 to 7 June, 2012. It is co-hosted again by the
Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE) and the Centre of
Excellence for Operations in Confined and Shallow Waters (COE CSW).
Contact for Public Affairs: CDR Alexander WALD (COE CSW), aw@alexander-wald.de or
CDR Sonya Cox (CJOS COE), public@maritimesecurityconference.org.
Information on the conference and on how to register can be found at:

http://www.maritimesecurityconference.org

Andrew J. Shapiro

adminsecurity — Fri, 11 May 2012 19:57:50 +0000

Andrew J. Shapiro
Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs
US Department of State
Mr Shapiro delivered an on-the-record address on the Obama Administration’s policies to combat piracy. His remarks launced the IISS-US Policy Makers Series.
Andrew Shapiro is the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. Previously, he served as Senior Advisor to Secretary Clinton and was the Senior Defense and Foreign Policy Advisor during her tenure in the Senate. Mr Shapiro received a joint law and masters in international affairs degree from Columbia University. He is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
As Prepared
Good afternoon and thank you Dr. Parasiliti for having me here today. For more than a half century the IISS has been one of the leading think tanks in international affairs not just in the UK, but in the world. I can not think of a better venue to speak with you about the challenges of piracy emanating from Somalia that now threatens maritime traffic across the entire Indian Ocean. IISS highlighted the problem of modern piracy before many were aware it existed. It was this organization that presciently warned in 2007 of the threat piracy would grow and spread, and IISS has continued to speak out against this international scourge.
Piracy is an age old problem. Pirates in the Mediterranean plagued the Roman Republic. In the sixteenth and seventeenth century piracy bedeviled European merchant ships in the Caribbean and elsewhere. America, too, confronted piracy in its earliest days. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, U.S. merchant ships and crews were subject to routine attacks by pirates from the Barbary States of North Africa. For years, it was deemed cheaper to pay them off than to fight. Then, as now, this answer proved counterproductive and unsustainable. The United States intensified its military and diplomatic efforts, eventually ending the tribute payments to Barbary pirates in 1815. The problem of how to deal with rogue individuals determined to exploit the security weaknesses in commercial maritime trade is not a new problem.
Yet the modern day implications of piracy are now global in scope. In today’s globalized age the problem of piracy is one that affects not just individual countries or shipping companies but potentially the entire global economy. We live in an era of complex and integrated global supply chains where people in countries around the world depend on safe and reliable shipping lanes for their food, their energy, their medicine, and basic consumer goods. By threatening one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes, piracy off the Horn of Africa threatens not just specific ships, but has broader strategic implications.
The problem is both significant and urgent.
Despite two years of international political and naval coordination, the problem is growing worse. Last year, 2010, witnessed the highest number of successful pirate attacks and hostages taken on record. And thus far 2011 is on track to be even higher. Close to 600 mariners from around the world are being held hostage in the region, some for as long as six months. Tragically, four Americans were brutally murdered by Somali pirates just last month.
The attacks are more ruthless, more violent and wider ranging. Hostages have been tortured and used as human shields and blowtorches have been used to open safe haven areas on ships in order to seize crews, and hold them for ransom. Pirates currently hold around 30 ships, most for ransom.
As international action has been taken to address the challenge, the pirates have responded. The way pirates operate has become more sophisticated. In recent months the use of mother ships – which are themselves pirated ships with hostage crews – has extended the pirates’ reach far beyond the Somali Basin. Mother ships launch and re-supply groups of pirates who use smaller, faster boats for attacks. They can carry dozens of pirates and tow many skiffs for multiple simultaneous attacks.
This has made pirates more difficult to interdict and more effective at operating in seasonal monsoons that previously restricted their activities. Somali pirates now operate in a total sea space of approximately 2.5 million square nautical miles, an increase from approximately 1 million square nautical miles two years ago. This increase makes it difficult for naval or law enforcement ships and other assets to reach the scene of a pirate attack quickly enough to disrupt an ongoing attack.
At Secretary Clinton’s direction, we are intensively reviewing our counter-piracy efforts to determine an even more energetic and comprehensive approach to respond to piracy in the Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean region. As we move forward, we are looking into many additional possible courses of action that seek to overcome the ongoing challenges of piracy.
In the near and mid-term, we plan to focus on several approaches that have the potential to significantly increase risks to the pirates while reducing by equal measure any potential rewards that they think they may gain. We are considering a broad range of options, from intensifying naval operations, to pursuing innovative approaches to prosecute and incarcerate pirates through innovative national and international approaches. Furthermore, we are looking at additional ways to more aggressively target those who organize, lead, and profit from piracy operations, including disrupting the financial networks that support them.
But before I go into depth on our way forward, let me discuss briefly the actions that are already underway.
To address the problem, the United States has, from the beginning, adopted a multilateral approach. Piracy affects the international community as a whole and can only be effectively addressed through broad, coordinated, and comprehensive international efforts. In January 2009, we helped establish the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, which now includes over 60 nations as well as international and industry organizations, to help coordinate national and international counter-piracy policies and actions.
We have also developed an integrated multi-dimensional approach toward combating piracy that focuses on: security – through the projection of military power to defend commercial and private vessels; prevention – through best practices measures conducted by the private sector; and deterrence – through effective legal prosecution and incarceration.
I’ll now expand on each of these areas:
First, security. In an effort to prevent attacks, the United States established Combined Task Force 151 — a multinational task force charged with conducting counter-piracy naval patrols in the region. The objective of this Combined Task Force is to secure freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations. It operates in the Gulf of Aden and off the eastern coast of Somalia, covering an area of over one million square miles. In addition to this effort, we have a number of coordinated multi-national naval patrols off the Horn of Africa. NATO is engaging in Operation Ocean Shield, the European Union has Operation ATALANTA, and other national navies in the area conduct counter-piracy patrols as well. On any given day up to 30 vessels from as many as 20 nations are engaged in counter-piracy operations in the region, including countries new to these kinds of effort like China and Japan.
U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) has also worked with partners to set up a 463-mile long corridor through the Gulf of Aden, called the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor or IRTC for short. This transit zone for commercial shipping is heavily patrolled by naval forces and used by some countries for convoy operations. Use of the IRTC has been successful in reducing the number of attacks within the corridor. But it also has had the unfortunate side effect of pushing pirate activities elsewhere, outside of the corridor. Naval forces are limited in their ability to disrupt attacks beyond the IRTC – there are simply an insufficient number of ships, helicopters, and overhead surveillance assets to patrol much beyond the corridor. International naval cooperation will continue to be necessary for the foreseeable future to help protect shipping and interdict pirate attacks, but naval presence on its own will be insufficient to prevent or measurably deter piracy beyond the IRTC. There is just too much open water to patrol.
The second area we have focused on is prevention. Any effective approach to combating piracy must involve the private sector. To prevent pirate activity, we have encouraged the commercial and private vessels to take action to prevent piracy before it happens.
The shipping industry is increasingly implementing industry-developed “best management practices” to prevent pirate boardings before they take place.
These guidelines were developed to identify self-protection measures that have proven successful in preventing boarding and seizure, and enabling rescues by naval forces when boarded. They include practical measures, such as:
proceeding at full speed through high risk areas,
placing additional lookouts on watches,
using closed circuit television to monitor vulnerable areas,
employing physical barriers such as razor wire,
reporting positions to military authorities, and
mustering the crew inside safe haven areas of the vessel.
These measures, when properly implemented, remain the most effective manner to protect against pirate attacks.
At the same time, there are vessels using the shipping lanes along the coast of Somalia that do not implement these recommended security measures. Approximately 20 percent of all ships off the Horn of Africa are not employing best management practices or taking proper security precautions. These 20 percent account for the overwhelming number of successfully pirated ships. These companies either deem these measures as not cost-effective or they unrealistically, some might say wishfully, assume that military forces will be present to intervene if pirates attack. As a result, some in the industry have been unwilling to invest in the basic security measures that would render them less vulnerable to attack.
We continue to discourage ransom payments and to actively seek to deny the benefits of concessions to hostage takers. The increase in attacks over the last year is a direct result of the enormous amounts of ransom now being paid to pirates. The United States has a long tradition of opposing the payment of ransom, and we have worked diligently to discourage or minimize ransoms. But many governments and private entities are paying, often too quickly and to the detriment of future victims, the escalating ransoms that enable the pirates’ predatory behavior. Some consider it the cost of doing business. However, every ransom paid, which now averages $4 million per incident and has reached as much as $9.2 million dollars, further institutionalizes the practice of hostage-taking for profit and funds its expansion as a criminal enterprise. Since January 2010, Somali pirates received approximately $75-85 million in the form of ransom payments. Of course, companies want to get their crews, ships, and cargoes back, but we have to find a way to break this cycle of increasing the pirates’ success and to shut down this ballooning criminal enterprise that makes piracy an increasingly lucrative profession, especially for the impoverished Horn of Africa.
Third, to deter piracy, effective legal prosecution is vital. We are urging all states to share the burden of prosecuting suspected pirates in their national courts, and incarcerating those convicted.
When attacks do occur, the international community needs effective and appropriate ways of dealing with captured pirates. Under international law, piracy is a crime of universal jurisdiction. This means that all states are authorized under international law to prosecute cases of piracy, whether or not that state has a direct link to the event. We applaud the approximately 18 countries that have pursued the prosecution of almost 950 pirates in their national courts. However, despite this figure, a significant number of suspected pirates encountered by naval forces are still being released without being prosecuted, sometimes for lack of evidence. We have not seen evidence that the prosecutions to date have had a deterrent effect, probably not least because pirates are reaping enormous returns with relatively little risk.
In addition, many of the countries affected by piracy – flag states, states from where many crew members hail, and many of our European partners – have proven to lack either the capacity or the political will to prosecute cases in their national courts. Furthermore, states in the region that have accepted suspects for prosecution to date have been reluctant to take more, citing limits to their judicial and prison capacities and insufficient financial support from the international community. As a result, too many suspected pirates we encounter at sea are simply released without any meaningful punishment or prosecution, and often simply keep doing what they were doing. This is the unacceptable ‘catch and release’ situation that has been widely criticized, and for which we must find a solution.
This multi-dimensional approach, focusing on security by expanding naval activities, emphasizing prevention through encouraging best practice measures by the private sector, and providing a deterrent through legal prosecution, provides a solid framework for our counter-piracy efforts.
Unfortunately further action is needed. As pirates have adapted their tactics to evade naval counter-piracy operations and shippers’ reliance on best management practices, we must respond in-kind by re-energizing and refocusing our counter-piracy approach. We are dealing with smart, hardened criminals who adapt to changing situations. We need to adapt to and counter their actions while moving forward with the sense of urgency the situation demands.
Before I continue, it is important to recognize thatpiracy’s root cause is state failure in Somalia, and cannot be resolved exclusively through naval patrols and interdictions. The reality is that there will be no end to piracy at sea until there is both political reconciliation and economic recovery on the ground in Somalia and a local government capable of and willing to enforce law and order on land and offshore. Achieving stability and good governance in Somalia represents the only sustainable long-term solution to piracy.
We are currently pursuing a diplomatic dual-track approach in Somalia to support the most important lines of action for countering piracy: building governance, security, and economic livelihoods on land in Somalia. On track one, we continue to support the Transitional Federal Government and the Djibouti Peace Process, as well as the African Union Mission in Somalia.
On track two, we are expanding engagement with local and regional administrations, civil society groups, and Somali clan leaders outside the Djibouti Peace Process who seek stability in Somalia and oppose extremism, including those in Somaliland, Puntland, and parts of South Central Somalia. In coordination with international partners, we will evaluate the utility of increased partnerships with regional governments of Somaliland and Puntland, as well as with local and regional administrative units throughout South Central Somalia, who are opposed to and who are willing to address piracy and governance concerns.
Achieving the necessary governance improvement throughout Somalia will not happen overnight, but this cannot deter us from supporting every improvement we can for the sake of greater stability in Somalia and, in the process, combating piracy.
Acknowledging the challenge of the situation ashore does not preclude progress at sea. We can make advances in combating piracy, irrespective of the situation in Somalia. But we must understand that this is a problem without a simple solution. There exists no silver bullet to solve modern piracy. Instead, there are a number of measures that can be taken to manage the problem and reduce its impact.
In the near and mid-term we can focus on several approaches that have the potential to significantly increase risks to the pirates while at the same time reduce their potential rewards. We are considering a broad range of options. These center on four key areas: pursuing additional mechanisms to prosecute and incarcerate pirates; aggressively targeting those who organize, lead, and profit from piracy operations; exploring expanded military options that will not place undue risks or burdens on our armed forces; and intensifying efforts to encourage the shipping industry to employ best management practices.
First, on enhancing the prosecution and incarceration of pirates. One of our major efforts to counter piracy has been to find creative ways to increase the ability and willingness of other states to undertake what should be a national responsibility to hold criminals accountable for attacks on national interests. The United States has actively prosecuted pirates involved in attacks on U.S. vessels where there has been sufficient evidence to support the case. To date, that totals 26 persons involved in several attacks:
the April 2009 attack on the MAERSK ALABAMA,
attacks in April of last year on the USS NICHOLAS and the USS ASHLAND,
and most recently, the attack in February that resulted in the killing of the four Americans on the QUEST.
Fourteen men, thirteen from Somalia and one frm Yemen, have been indicted on federal criminal charges for their suspected involvement in this heinous incident. The Somali pirate convicted in the MAERSK ALABAMA attack received a sentence of 33 years and 9 months and the pirates involved in the NICHOLAS attack have received life sentences plus 80 years. These successful prosecutions, like the over 900 other national prosecutions taking place around the world, prove that pirates can be successfully prosecuted in any state with the basic judicial capacity and political will to do so.
Despite these successes, we need to acknowledge the reality that many states, to varying degrees, have not demonstrated sustained political will to criminalize piracy under their domestic law and use such laws to prosecute those who attack their interests and incarcerate the convicted. The world’s largest flag registries – so-called “flags of convenience” – have proven either incapable or unwilling to take responsibility. And given the limited venues for prosecution, states have been reluctant to pursue prosecutions of apparent or incomplete acts of piracy, limiting our ability to prosecute suspects not caught in the middle of an attack.
It is true that suspected pirates have been successfully prosecuted in ordinary courts throughout history. Because of this, the Administration has previously been reluctant to support the idea of creating an extraordinary international prosecution mechanism for this common crime. Instead, the Administration has focused on encouraging regional states to prosecute pirates domestically in their national courts. However, in light of the problems I’ve described to you today, the United States is now willing to consider pursuing some creative and innovative ways to go beyond ordinary national prosecutions and enhance our ability to prosecute and incarcerate pirates in a timely and cost-effective manner. We are working actively with our partners in the international community to help set the conditions for expanded options in the region. In fact, we recently put forward a joint proposal with the United Kingdom suggesting concrete steps to address some of the key challenges we continue to face.
One of the most important things we must do is expand incarceration capacity in the region, as lack of prison capacity is perhaps the most common reason states are reluctant to accept pirates for prosecution. We are already seeing progress in this area. Just this week, a new maximum security prison opened in Northern Somalia to hold convicted pirates. We also support the efforts underway to develop a framework to accommodate the transfer of convicted pirates back to Somalia to serve their sentences in their home country.
In addition, we have suggested consideration of a specialized piracy court or chamber to be established in one or more regional states. The international community is currently considering this idea, along with similar models that would combine international and domestic elements. These ideas are under discussion both in the UN Security Council and in the Contact Group.
It is also critical to continue to support and enhance the prosecution-related programs in the region that are already underway. And we continue to believe one of the most vital aspects remains Somalia’s long term ability to construct its own active and independent judicial system.
The second area we are considering is how to more effectively target financial flows from piracy, possibly by using approaches similar to the ones we use to target terrorists.
Somali piracy is an organized criminal enterprise, like a mafia or racketeering criminal organization. A key element of our overall counter-piracy approach is the disruption of piracy-related financial flows. We need to hit pirate supply lines – cutting them off at the source. A significant effort must be made to track where pirates get their fuel, supplies, ladders and outboard motors in Somalia and in other nearby countries and to explore means to disrupt this supply. Most importantly, we must focus on pirate leaders and financiers to deny them the means to benefit from ransom proceeds. They must be tracked and hunted by following the money that fuels their operations using all available information. This should include by tracing the money that fuels their operations with the same level of rigor and discipline we currently employ to combat other transnational organized crime.
This is particularly critical, considering the recent uncorroborated open source reports of possible links, direct or indirect, between al-Shabaab in Somalia – specifically al-Shabaab-linked militia – and pirates. Al-Shabaab and the pirates operate largely in separate geographic areas and have drastically opposed ideologies. However, we have seen reports that al-Shabaab is receiving ad-hoc protection fees from pirate gangs working in the same area. Obviously, this is concerning. Let me be clear: while we have seen no evidence to date of direct ties between the two groups, it would not be uncommon for criminal gangs working in the same ungoverned space to share resources or pay kickbacks to one another.
Finally, it is time to explore additional means to map and disrupt the financial flows and criminal masterminds behind the business of piracy before any links are solidified or money is put into the pockets of a group responsible for terrorist attacks. At the beginning of March, the United States hosted a meeting of Contact Group members at which the international community began discussing the development of methods to detect, track, disrupt, and interdict illicit financial transactions connected to piracy and the criminal networks that finance piracy. As we make progress and pirate leaders are identified, we should press local authorities in the piracy-affected region to take action against these leaders and either prosecute them or turn them over to other states for prosecution. Piracy is impacting Americans’, Africans’, and others’ lives around the world, and we should devote resources commensurate to the problem.
The third area we are exploring for increased action involves additional ways to work with our Department of Defense colleagues to take further action at sea, focusing on steps that would have real impacts on pirate activity without overextending our military. For its part, the United States Navy is already taking proactive measures to remove pirate boats from action when they can do so without unduly risking human life or unnecessarily expending scare resources. Just last week, U.S. naval forces successfully answered a Philippine-flagged merchant vessel’s distress call as pirates attempted to board. U.S. forces, already in the area as part of Operation Enduring Freedom, fired warning shots, causing the pirates to flee and foiling the attack. As American assets were already on the scene, the U.S. military was ready and able to respond without stretching our armed forces too thin.
We at the State Department need to continue to work with our DoD colleagues to explore using other tools at our disposal to further disrupt pirate vessels at sea. Of course, we must always act in a fashion that does not cause the situation on land in Somalia to worsen.
Fourth and finally, we must intensify our efforts to encourage commercial vessels to adopt best management practices. The best defense against piracy is vigilance on the part of the maritime industry. The vast majority of successful pirate attacks are against ships that do not adopt best management practices. The U.S. government requires U.S.-flagged vessels sailing in designated high-risk waters to take additional security measures, including having extra lookouts, having extra communications equipment, and being prepared at all times to evade or resist pirate boarding. I would note that, to date, not a single ship employing armed guards has been successfully pirated.
Combating piracy is not just the job of governments. It requires joint action from both the international community and the private sector. If all commercial fleets worldwide were to implement the measures as appropriate, we would be in a much better position to reduce the rate of successful pirate attacks. Our partners in the maritime industry must continue to step up and take further action to do their part.
In the cat and mouse game of modern day piracy, we must always look for new methods and new approaches to improve our efforts. After all, this is exactly what the pirates are doing. I believe we have the right multi-faceted framework in place to address the challenge. Focusing on security by expanding naval activities; emphasizing prevention by encouraging best practice measures by the private sector and dissuading lavish ransom sums; providing a deterrent through enhanced legal prosecution; and efforts to disrupt the financial flows all provide a solid way forward. There is much work to do in the coming months and years, but through the shared commitment of the United States and the international community the challenge of modern-day piracy is one that we will surely meet.
Thank you. With that, I’d be happy to take a few questions.

Somalian pirates have been struggled by Russian naval forces

adminsecurity — Fri, 11 May 2012 19:57:03 +0000

The photos below show how the Somalian pirates have been struggled by Russian naval forces for the last several years.
Somalian pirates belong to modern armed groups that capture foreign ships next to the Somalian coast and demand for redemption.
Naval forces of Russia, India and some other countries patrol the Gulf of Aden to prevent the crime.
On November 7 2009 Dutch ship CEC Future with 11 Russian citizens was captured by the pirates.
The pirates sailed close to that ship.
That time the pirates were paid and no military intervention was used.
A small plane got the redemption.
The criminals counted the money and sailed away in an unknown direction.
The sum is not mentioned but it is known that they usually ask for 1-2 mln US dollars.
The Russian ship accompanies the saved vessel in its trip to Oman.
The Russian nuclear-powered cruiser arrests three vessels with pirates.
10 Somalian citizens were taken aboard.
The arrested people had a G-3 rifle, an AK-47 gun, and 2 AKMS assault rifles.
They also had drugs, large amount of money, a bag with rice and a bag with sugar.
The pirates were under the influence of drugs.
The Russian tanker Moscow University was captured by pirates on May 5, 2010. There were 23 Russian passengers aboard.
The crew had to take 86 tones of petroleum to China and was saved by another Russian ship Marshall Shaposhnikov.
The pirates were first arrested and then redeemed due to lack of evidence.

http://www.security.gr/somalian-pirates-struggled-russian-naval-forces/

Maritime Piracy and Anti-Terrorism Reference Book

adminsecurity — Fri, 11 May 2012 19:55:21 +0000

with comprehensive Ship Security Plan

New Updated Version Coming Soon – Release date 04 November 2009

SKU# EB0901 – Electronic Version via Download
SKU# CD0901 – Electronic Version on CD-ROM
SKU# PB0901 – Hardcopy Printed Version

Protect any vessel, anywhere, all the time!

This publication provides the vessel owner and/or operator with a complete set of procedures and countermeasure covering a wide range of maritime security related tasks; from routine security to anti-piracy procedures, including anti-terrorismplanning.

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Oil rigs and platforms.
Research vessels.
Yachts, charter vessels, and expedition vessels.
Bluewater cruisers, passagemakers, and long-range voyagers; power or sail.
The Maritime Piracy and Anti-Terrorism Reference Book is a stand-alone resource ready for immediate deployment and implementation on any vessel. No further consultation is required.

Unmatched credentials:

Proven and validated during a real world hostile attack on a U.S. research vessel off the coast of Somalia 12 days before Sep 11 2001.
Comprehensive maritime security information.
Anti-terrorism and anti-piracy procedures.
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Protect any vessel – anywhere, all the time!
The only complete maritime security guide and reference book.
Developed by U.S. military and government counterterrorism experts.
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PROVEN! The first version of the Ship Security Plan was put to actual use just weeks before the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks on America. Click on the links below to read actual message traffic related to the incident:

Read the pirate attack email our office received dated August 31 2001.
Read the Anti-Shipping Activity Message (ASAM) from the U.S. National Geospatial Intelligence Agency. Message Reference Number 2001-243.
If you are interested in obtaining this product, please contact us by using ourContact Form.

RPG-7

adminsecurity — Fri, 11 May 2012 19:54:31 +0000

Weapon: RPG-7 (variants: RPG-7V, CHICOM Type-69)
Country of Origin: Russia, China, others
Original Designed Use: Anti-armor, anti-personnel, bunker buster
Terrorist Use: Anti-armor, anti-vehicle, anti-ship, anti-personnel, anti-aircraft, building and bunker buster
Max Effective Range: 500 m (PG-7V warhead), up to 1400 m as improvised indirect-fire; varies by warhead
Destructive Power: 230mm armor, 1.5 m brick wall (PG-7V warhead); others up to 700mm armor, varies by warhead
Launcher Bore Size: 40mm (tube)
Launcher Length: 953mm (w/o projectile), 1340mm (w/projectile)
Launcher Weight: 6.3 kg unloaded w/ optical sight
Launcher Materials: Steel w/ wood or plastic handgrips and heat shield
Projectile Diameter: 85mm (PG-7V warhead); up to 105mm, varies by warhead
Projectile Weight: 2.25 kg (PG-7V warhead); varies by warhead
Sighting System: Optic scope (primary), Iron sights (secondary)

The RPG-7 is the ubiquitous “terrorist weapon” and it is a favored and standard weapon of maritime pirates. Lets take a look at why…

The RPG-7 is a reloadable, muzzle loaded, shoulder-fired, smoothbore recoilless rocket propelled grenade launcher that fires an unguided rocket/grenade. The “grenade launcher” definition throws some people off because the RPG-7 is seen as a “rocket launcher” more than a “grenade launcher”. It is essentially both. The projectile (rocket and warhead) is classified as a grenade, hence the designation of “rocket propelled grenade launcher”.

Introduced in 1961, the weapon was designed and originally made in the former USSR and then produced in a number of the Warsaw Pact countries. Like many Russian weapons, it was copied by China and other nations. The RPG-7 was preceded by the less powerful RPG-3/RPG-2, and has seen service in every area of conflict since the Vietnam War. It is still produced by several nations, including Russia and China.

Imminently flexible. A selection of anti-armor, anti-materiel, and anti-personnel warheads make the RPG-7 weapon system suitable for a wide variety of missions while providing more firepower through more ammunition for a given weight/space. The closest U.S. equivalent is the LAW and AT-4 anti-armor weapons, but these are “one shot” disposable weapons; the launchers are discarded after each shot, and each launcher/warhead assembly takes up as much space as two RPG -7 warheads.

Easily mastered and easy to employ. The RPG-7 was originally designed as a crew-served weapon,

meaning at least two people are needed to load and fire it, but with training, a gunner can handle it alone and achieve a good shot every 15 or 20 seconds; carrying extra ammo and reloading it without taking it off your shoulder is where the second person (or “crew”) comes in. The second person would also act as security for the RPG-7 gunner. Pirates usually employ the RPG-7 as an individual weapon, much like a rifle would be used.

Why do terrorists and pirates like the RPG-7 so much?
It is hard to beat the RPG-7 as a versatile and easy to use and effective multi-purpose weapon. They are affordable and available just about anywhere there is conflict, and ammunition is plentiful and cheap. An RPG-7 launcher can be purchased in certain areas for less than $300.00 (USD); with ammunition costing anywhere from $25.00 to $50.00 (USD) for each round.

Terrorists have used this weapon to take out Abrams main battle tanks; they have shot down Blackhawk and Chinook helicopters with it; and they have successfully engaged any number of vehicles, convoys, and troop formations killing and injuring a great number of U.S. and coalition military personnel. Ships have been fired upon as well. Simply put, the RPG-7 works and it is adaptable to the conventional and unconventional mission specific needs of both pirates and terrorists.

Improvise and adapt. When the Russians designed the RPG they intended it as a

horizontal direct-fire weapon; meaning it fires the projectile directly at a ground-based target with no elevation other than a small amount to account for range. Give a foot soldier (or terrorist) enough time and he will come up with more and better uses for any given weapon, and the RPG is a perfect example of this. It has been used as an expedient indirect-fire weapon against troop formations, firebases, airfields, buildings, and other targets. Although it isn’t highly accurate when used in this manner, it is very effective against targets spread over an area; it becomes the terrorist’s improvised short range artillery piece.

The RPG-7 has also been adapted to serve as expedient anti-aircraft artillery against low-flying helicopters. The first generation of RPG-7 rounds had no self-destruct mechanism and only detonated on impact. These older rounds can be lobbed out to approximately 1400 meters by super elevating the launcher; newer generation RPG-7 rounds self-detonate after a time of flight equivalent to roughly 900 meters, which limits their range as improvised indirect-fire weapons, but increases their effectiveness as anti-helicopter weapons because they burst in mid-air.

Firing the RPG-7 As a “recoilless” rocket launcher, it has very little recoil when fired because the propellant charge blast is vented through the rear of the launcher, but the launcher will jerk or jump slightly on firing as the rocket overcomes being held in place by a friction fit. The rocket is shot out of the tube by an explosive booster which gets it moving towards the target for about ten meters while the internal rocket motor is simultaneously igniting. The firing sequence produces a sizable back-blast with report, and the rocket leaves a smoke trail while traveling to the target giving it a very visible launch signature. It is difficult to hide when firing the RPG-7; the shooter must move out of his firing position quickly after firing if he (or she) hopes to survive.

Hollywood Myths
Contrary to what is depicted on TV and in the movies, the detonation of an RPG-7 anti-armor warhead will not produce a dramatic fireball and large explosion. The exception to this is if the warhead detonates and causes a sympathetic or chain reaction explosion of other flammables or explosives. The typical RPG-7 anti-armor warhead detonates with a seemingly small flash followed by a dark gray explosive cloud. This is due to the fact that the warhead contains a relatively small amount of explosives and employs the “shaped charge” principle to achieve armor penetration.

The PG-7V anti-armor warhead will make a hole approximately 18mm in diameter on steel or armor; the shaped charge detonates and forces hot gasses and molten metal through this hole and into the crew compartment or inside of the target for the purpose of killing personnel and/or detonating any stored ammunition. It should also be noted that a TBG-7V warhead is available which contains a thermobaric fuel air explosive designed as a bunker buster and this warhead does produce a sizable fireball explosion. However, it is not as widely available as the typical anti-armor and anti-personnel warheads.

Defending against RPGsA simple “stand-off” barrier of common chain-link or cyclone fencing will serve as a good countermeasure against RPG rounds when emplaced at a standoff of at least 24 inches from the protected area (the further the better). It does so by detonating and/or disrupting the shaped charge of the warhead before it strikes the target surface. There is still a significant explosive and shrapnel effect but armor or hardened surface penetration can be effectively mitigated.

Pirate and Maritime Terrorist Weapons

adminsecurity — Fri, 11 May 2012 19:53:18 +0000

The maritime pirates of today have access to a sizable variety of compact and effective weapons. They may not be lobbing 18-pound balls from carronades like the old days, but they have found some very effective tools like the RPG-7 to persuade mariners to heave-to on the high seas. We’ll take a look at how these weapons are employed and find out why they are so effective.

The Somali pirates are attacking ships from land based firing positions by using Russian made 82mm mortars that can reach as far as 5 kilometers from shore. They have also mounted 60mm mortars on some of their attack boats. While our files are being fully updated, let’s take a look at the pirate’s favorite: The RPG-7

Light Weapons

AK-47
Heavy Weapons

DsHK 12.7mm Heavy Machinegun
SPG-9 Recoilless Gun
82mm Recoilless Gun
ZU-1
ZSU-23
Mortars
Rockets

Διώρυγα Σουέζ

adminsecurity — Fri, 11 May 2012 19:51:58 +0000

Η διώρυγα του Σουέζ είναι η μεγαλύτερη διώρυγα του κόσμου, συνολικού μήκους 168 χλμ. που, προσθέτοντας τα σημεία αγκυροβολίων και το μήκος της ενδιάμεσης λίμνης, φθάνει τα 190 χλμ.. Έχει μέγιστο πλάτος, σε ορισμένα σημεία, 160-200 μ. και βάθος 11,60 μ. Διατρέχει κατά διεύθυνση Βορρά – Νότο τον ισθμό του Σουέζ ,ενώνοντας τη Μεσόγειο θάλασσα με την Ερυθρά θάλασσα. Αρχίζει από το Πορτ Σάιντ, λιμένα εισόδου στη Μεσόγειο και καταλήγει στον λιμένα Σουέζ που βρίσκεται στο μυχό του ομώνυμου κόλπου της Ερυθράς.

Υπ΄ όψη ότι η Μεσόγειος και η Ερυθρά θάλασσα δεν παρουσιάζουν μεταξύ τους υψομετρική διαφορά. Επίσης, κατά το μεγαλύτερο μέρος της, η διώρυγα είναι πλεύσιμη κατά μία κατεύθυνση.
Ιστορία διάνοιξης

Η πρωταρχική σκέψη διάνοιξης διώρυγας στη περιοχή ήταν εκείνη που φέρεται να σχεδιάστηκε επί Φαραώ Σέτη Α΄ ή Ραμσή Β΄ (σύμφωνα με κάποιο αρχαίο κείμενο) περί τον 13 αιώνα π.Χ. που θα ένωνε το δέλτα του ποταμού Νείλου με την Ερυθρά. Έπρεπε όμως να περάσουν1000 ακόμη χρόνια για να επανέλθει το θέμα περί τον 8ο αιώνα αλλά και πάλι το ενδιαφέρον αυτό ανακόπηκε. Έτσι το 1854 ο Γάλλος διπλωμάτης και μηχανικός Κόμης Φερδινάνδος Λεσσέψ που κέντρισε το ενδιαφέρον του Αντιβασιλέα της Αιγύπτου Σαΐντ Πασά παίρνει την εντολή της κατασκευής (διάνοιξης) και ξεκινάει το έργο. Το 1858 η συσταθείσα κατασκευαστική εταιρεία καταφέρνει την συνυπογραφή συμβολαίου για 99 χρόνια εκμετάλλευσης και στη συνέχεια την παραχώρησή της στην Αίγυπτο. Και έτσι φθάνουμε στις 25 Απριλίου του 1869 όπου και ολοκληρώνεται η διάνοιξη και στις 17 Νοεμβρίου 1869 δίνεται ελεύθερη στην ναυσιπλοΐα όπου και πραγματοποιούνται τελικά τα επίσημα εγκαίνια. Το συνολικό κόστος της κατασκευής της έφθασε τα τότε 100 εκατομμύρια δολάρια. Στην κατασκευή της συμμετείχαν και Έλληνες Δωδεκανήσιοι από την Κάσο και το Καστελόριζο κάποιοι από τους οποίους εγκαταστάθηκαν μόνιμα στην περιοχή.

Η σημασία της στη Παγκόσμια Ναυσιπλοΐα είναι τεράστια. Ενώνοντας τη Μεσόγειο με την Ερυθρά Θάλασσα δημιουργεί μια πραγματικά εμπορική αρτηρία Ευρώπης – ΝΔ, Νότιας και ΝΑ Ασίας μέχρι Άπω Ανατολής.

Νεότερη ιστορία

Όπως είναι φυσικό η ιστορία της διώρυγας ταυτίσθηκε με εκείνη της Χώρας. Ύστερα από το πραξικόπημα που εκδηλώθηκε στις 23 Ιουλίου του 1952 και την αποχώρηση του Βασιλέως Φαρούκ από τη Χώρα, το Επαναστατικό Συμβούλιο έστρεψε αμέσως τη προσοχή του στη βρετανική κατοχή της διώρυγας. Έτσι άρχισαν να εκδηλώνονται συνεχείς αντιστασιακές ενέργειες με την υποστήριξη της στρατιωτικής κυβέρνησης. Οι ελπίδες των Άγγλων ότι οι Αιγύπτιοι στρατιωτικοί θα έδειχναν περισσότερη κατανόηση της στρατηγικής παρουσίας τους και μάλιστα κατά τη διάρκεια του “ψυχρού πολέμου”, τελικά διαψεύστηκαν. Η ίδια η κυβέρνηση του Τσώρτσιλ αναγκάσθηκε να παραδεχτεί ότι η παρουσία 80.000 στρατιωτών σε μια βάση περικυκλωμένη από εχθρικό πληθυσμό δεν μπορεί να παρέχει καμιά στρατιωτική αξία. Το 1956 ο Νάσερ κρατικοποίησε τη διώρυγα θέτοντας τέρμα στη βρετανική κυριαρχία με συνέπεια ένα αγγλογαλλικό εγχείρημα κατά της Αιγύπτου το οποίο απέτυχε μεν, αλλά κράτησε κλειστή τη διώρυγα μέχρι το 1957. Ένας μεγάλος αριθμός πλοηγών και κατωτέρων υπαλλήλων της εταιρείας ήταν Έλληνες με πολύ μεγάλες αποδοχές.

Αργότερα στο Πόλεμο των έξι Ημερών τον Ιούνιο του 1967, κατά τον Αραβοϊσραηλινό πόλεμο, η διώρυγα έπαθε σοβαρές ζημιές που τη κράτησαν κλειστή επί επτά χρόνια μεσολαβούσα και η νεώτερη Ισραηλινο-αιγυπτιακή σύγκρουση τον Οκτώβριο του 1973. Τελικά μετά και από αφιλοκερδή διάθεση κάποιων βυθοκόρων από τον Ι. Λάτση και άλλους Έλληνες εφοπλιστές η διώρυγα καθαρίστηκε από τα ναυάγια και δόθηκε στην εξυπηρέτηση των θαλασσίων μεταφορών τον Μάιο το 1975.

Τα πλοία που διέρχονται τη διώρυγα καταβάλουν στο αιγυπτιακό δημόσιο τέλη διέλευσης (διόδια) κατά κόρο καθαράς χωρητικότητας που υπολογίζεται με βάση της “χωρητικότητας διώρυγας Σουέζ” (Suez Canal Tonnage) περίπου 23% παραπάνω των βρετανικών υπολογισμών. Επίσης τα πλοία υποβάλλονται σε υποχρεωτική πλοήγηση από την είσοδο μέχρι την έξοδό τους. Τα πλοία που διέρχονται σήμερα τη διώρυγα είναι μέχρι 150.000 dwt φορτωμένα, αλλά και μεγαλύτερα εφόσον είναι κενά φορτίου, με επιτρεπτό έτσι βύθισμα. Ευνόητο είναι ότι τα Δεξαμενόπλοια άνω των 150.000 dwt έμφορτα καθώς και εκείνα των 200, 300 και 400 χιλ.τον. παραπλέουν το Ακρωτήριο της Κ. Ελπίδος (Cap Route) επιβαρυνόμενα σημαντικά τη μεγάλη διαφορά απόστασης.

Σημειώνεται ότι η διώρυγα Σουέζ αν και έχει χαρακτηριστεί ως ουδέτερη θάλασσα εντούτοις έχει παραβιαστεί ο όρος δύο φορές πρώτα από την ίδια την Αίγυπτο το 1956 όσο και το 1967 κατά τον Αραβοϊσραηλινό πόλεμο.
Πόλεις της διώρυγας

Πορτ Σάιντ: Είναι η βόρεια είσοδος έξοδος της διώρυγας στη Μεσόγειο θάλασσα. Τελευταία η σημασία της έχει αυξηθεί μετά από τον προσδιορισμό της σε ζώνη αφορολόγητων αγαθών.
Ισμαηλία: Βρίσκεται σχεδόν στο μέσον της διώρυγας στη σχηματιζόμενη λίμνη Τσιμάχ όπου και αντιπαρέρχονται οι νηοπομπές (κομβόια των πλοίων – ανόδου και καθόδου). Η Ισμαηλία είναι μια ήσυχη πόλη με πολλούς κήπους και ήρεμες λεωφόρους (συγκριτικά με του Καΐρου).
Σουέζ: Είναι η νότια είσοδος έξοδος της διώρυγας στον ομώνυμο κόλπο της Ερυθράς. Το Σουέζ έχει όμορφες παραλίες που εκτείνονται νότια της ακτογραμμής.
Διάφορα χαρακτηριστικά

Για την πληρέστερη κατανόηση της σημασίας της Διώρυγας Σουέζ κρίνεται αναγκαία η παράθεση των ακόλουθων στοιχείων:

Πριν το κλείσιμο της διώρυγας το 1966, το μέσο βάθος κυμαίνονταν στα 38 πόδια και μέσο πλάτος αυτής στα 90 μέτρα. Μετά τον καθαρισμό, την εκβάθυνση, διαπλάτυνση και την επαναλειτουργία της, σήμερα έχει μέσο βάθος 63 πόδια και μέσο πλάτος τα 160 μέτρα που επιτρέπουν έτσι τη διέλευση έμφορτων πλοίων των 150.000 τόν.d.w.
Γενικά η χρήση της διώρυγας του Σουέζ επιφέρει τις ακόλουθες μειώσεις αποστάσεων:
Η απόσταση Περσικού ή Αραβικού Κ. – Μεσογείου (μέσω Ακρωτηρίου Αφρικής) είναι 10.800 μίλια και Ευρώπης 11.100 μίλια. Μέσω Σουέζ η πρώτη είναι 4.700 μίλια και η δεύτερη 6.400 μίλια.
Η απόσταση Μεσογείου – Δυτ. ακτών Αμερικής είναι 12.000 μίλια, ενώ με χρήση της διώρυγας Σουέζ μειώνονται στα 8.300 μίλια.
Επίσης με το κλείσιμο της διώρυγας το 1966 επήλθε μια περιορισμένη ναυτιλιακή κρίση κυρίως στους λιμένες της Μεσογείου. Συγκεκριμένα από ναυτιλιακά στοιχεία της εποχής η κίνηση στον λιμένα της Τεργέστης από την Μέση Ανατολή μειώθηκε κατά 30%, αλλά και στην Ελλάδα τα ναυπηγεία Σκαραμαγκά και Περάματος αντιμετώπισαν μείωση επισκευαστικών εργασιών τους κατά 60-75%. Επίσης ενώ το 1965 μόνο 5 εκατομμύρια τόννοι πετρελαίου που προορίζονταν για Χώρες της Ανατολικής Ευρώπης ακολουθούσαν την από Ακρωτηρίου θαλάσσια οδό, το 1966 τετραπλασιάσθηκαν οι μεταφορές απ΄ αυτή την οδό για να φθάσουν το 1972 τα διερχόμενα φορτία από το Ακρωτήριο της Αφρικής το 85% του συνόλου του εξαγωγών ακαθάρτου πετρελαίου από τις Αραβικές Χώρες προς τη Βόρεια Αφρική, Μεσόγειο, και Β. Ευρώπη. Από το τονάζ αυτό το 45% μετέφεραν πλέον δεξαμενόπλοια άνω των 200.000 τόν.d.w. Ήταν η εποχή που ξεκίναγε ο γιγαντισμός των πλοίων.

Πειρατεία

adminsecurity — Fri, 11 May 2012 19:50:18 +0000

Η πειρατεία είναι ένα από τα σοβαρότερα εγκλήματα του Διεθνούς Δικαίου.

Ορισμός

Για τον ακριβή ορισμό της πειρατείας δεν υφίσταται σύμφωνη γνώμη των διεθνολόγων. Κατά τον επίσημο ορισμό του Οργανισμού Ηνωμένων Εθνών, όπως περιλαμβάνεται στο άρθρο 100, 101, της Σύμβασης των Η.Ε. (1982), (“Περί ανοικτών θαλασσών”), πειρατεία ονομάζεται κάθε πράξη βίας ή αιχμαλώτισης ή απόσπασης, η οποία διαπράττεται στην ανοιχτή θάλασσα ή τα διεθνή ύδατα από το πλήρωμα ή τους επιβάτες ενός ιδιωτικού πλοίου ή αεροσκάφους, και στρέφεται εναντίον προσώπων ή ιδιοκτησίας που μεταφέρονται με ένα άλλο σκάφος.[1]

Διάκριση

Κατά την κρατούσα άποψη και τη σύγχρονη πρακτική η πειρατεία συνίσταται από τις ακόλουθες πράξεις:

Κάθε παράνομη πράξη άσκησης βίας ή κράτησης ή πράξη διαρπαγής που τελείται για ιδιωτικούς σκοπούς υπό του πληρώματος, ή επιβατών ενός πλοίου ή αεροσκάφους και στρέφεται: α) εις μεν τις ανοικτές θάλασσες εναντίον άλλου πλοίου ή αεροσκάφους ή εναντίον προσώπων ή περιουσίας επί του ίδιου του σκάφους ή αεροσκάφους, β) εναντίον πλοίου ή αεροσκάφους, προσώπων ή περιουσιακών στοιχείων σε τόπο μη υποκείμενο σε δικαιοδοσία κάποιου Κράτους.
Κάθε πράξη εκούσιας συμμετοχής σε παραπάνω δράση πλοίου ή αεροσκάφους με πλήρη γνώση ότι καθίσταται αυτό πειρατικό.
Κάθε πράξη υποκίνησης ή εκ προθέσεως διευκόλυνσης μίας των παραπάνω πράξεων.
Εξαιρέσεις

Σύμφωνα με τα παραπάνω, δεν αποτελεί πειρατεία η διάπραξη τέτοιων ενεργειών από τις νόμιμες αρχές ενός κράτους στα πλαίσια άσκησης των καθηκόντων τους, π.χ. στο ενδεχόμενο που μεταφέρονται με αυτό παράνομα εμπορεύματα, έχει εισέλθει παράνομα στα χωρικά ύδατα ή έχει εκδοθεί εντολή κατάσχεσής του. Είναι όμως πειρατεία η διάπραξη τέτοιων ενεργειών από πλήρωμα σκάφους που ανήκει μεν στις νόμιμες αρχές, αλλά έχει στασιάσει το πλήρωμά του, εξομειούμενο έτσι σε ιδιωτικό.[2]

Επίσης, δε χαρακτηρίζεται πειρατεία η αιχμαλώτιση ή καταλήστευση ενός σκάφους από τις Ένοπλες Δυνάμεις μιας εχθρικής χώρας σε καιρό πολέμου – σε αυτήν την περίπτωση ομιλούμε περί απόσπασης λείας, αντίστοιχης της λαφυραγώγησης στον κατά ξηράν πόλεμο.

Ετυμολογία – Βασικές έννοιες

Οι λέξεις «πειρατεία» και «πειρατής» προέρχονται από το αρχαίο ελληνικό ρήμα πειράω-ῶ, το οποίο σημαίνει προσπαθώ, δοκιμάζω. Η πρώτη γραπτή εμφάνισή τους (τοῖς πειραταῖς) γίνεται σε ένα αθηναϊκόψήφισμα της ελληνιστικής περιόδου προς τιμήν του στρατηγού Επιχάρους, ο οποίος κατά το Χρεμωνίδειο πόλεμο διακρίθηκε στη φύλαξη των ακτών της πόλης.[3]

Αυτό δεν σημαίνει ότι η πειρατεία ήταν ανύπαρκτη πριν τα ελληνιστικά χρόνια – τουναντίον, από τις απαρχές της ιστορίας είχε ενδημικό χαρακτήρα σε πολλά μέρη της Μεσογείου. Η αρχαία ελληνική γραμματεία βρίθει αναφορών από τα ομηρικά κιόλας έπη, για ομάδες που επέδραμαν από θαλάσσης εναντίον ξένων πλοίων ή παραλιακών πόλεων με σκοπό τον προσπορισμό πλούτου και σκλάβων. Χρησιμοποιούσε όμως τη λέξη «ληστής», τόσο για την κατά ξηράν όσο και για την κατά θάλασσαν ληστεία.

Κατά το μεσαίωνα εμφανίσθηκε στη Δυτική Ευρώπη ένας νέος εννοιολογικός διαχωρισμός, όσον αφορά το ηθικό και νομικό περιεχόμενο της πειρατείας. Ως πειρατής περιγραφόταν πια ο παράνομος που λήστευε πλοία τόσο σε καιρό ειρήνης όσο και πολέμου, ενώ ως κουρσάρος (από τo γαλλικό corsaire) ο ιδιώτης που εξουσιοδοτείτο από τις αρχές ενός κράτους να διαπράττει πειρατικές ενέργειες εναντίον εχθρικών, (προς το κράτος εντολέα), πλοίων και πόλεων σε καιρό πολέμου («κούρσα»). Βεβαίως ο κουρσάρος της μιας αντιμαχόμενης πλευράς, όσες εξουσιοδοτήσεις κι αν διέθετε, συνέχιζε να θεωρείται πειρατής για την άλλη.

Με την εμφάνιση των εναερίων μεταφορικών μέσων κατά τον 20ό αιώνα δημιουργήθηκε ακόμα ένας όρος: η αεροπειρατεία, δηλαδή η ανάληψη του ελέγχου ενός πολιτικού αεροσκάφους (ή τμήματός του) από άτομα διαφορετικά από το νόμιμο πλήρωμά του, ή ακόμα και η χρήση ενός αεροσκάφους από το νόμιμο πλήρωμά του, αλλά με διαφορετικό σκοπό από αυτόν που είναι εντεταλμένο.

Τέλος, τα τελευταία χρόνια η λέξη «πειρατεία» χρησιμοποιείται για να συνυποδηλώσει διάφορες παράνομες ενέργειες που δεν έχουν σχέση με το κυριολεκτικό νόημά της. Πιο χαρακτηριστικό παράδειγμα είναι ηπειρατεία λογισμικού, δηλ. η παράνομη χρήση, αντιγραφή ή διάδοση με ψηφιακό τρόπο υλικού που προστατεύεται από πνευματικά δικαιώματα.

Somalia – the pirate’s safe haven

adminsecurity — Fri, 11 May 2012 19:48:55 +0000

Geo coordinates: 10 00 N, 49 00 E
Location: Eastern Africa, bordering the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean.

MARAD Notice to Mariners (Piracy – Gulf of Aden/2008)
MARAD Notice To Mariners (Piracy – Somalia)

Somalia, a lawless country located in the Horn of Africa region, has no effective central government, and it is dominated by violent clan-based militia groups who are controlled by warlords. It remains as a safe haven for extremists, terrorists, and of course, pirates.

Somalia is strategically located and adjacent to one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world along the southern approaches to Bab el Mandeb Strait and the route through the Red Sea and Suez Canal. The proximity to shipping and the lack of any effective government combine to make Somalia the perfect safe haven for maritime pirates. They operate from Somalia with virtual impunity and have become folk heroes to most Somalis in the process.

There are large numbers of naval and ground military forces of several nations deployed in the region as a result of the Global War On Terrorism and its related operations. Some of those forces include:

Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) – Counter-Piracy Operations
Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150) – Maritime Security Operations
Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)
In spite of the military presence, the Somali pirates continue to increase their level of audacity and have extended their reach to hundreds of miles offshore. The presence of naval warships and increased aerial reconnaissance by the military forces of several nations has had minimal impact on the Somali pirates. There have been recent successful interventions, but the pirates are shifting their operations faster than military forces can react.

However, the newly established counter-piracy task force CTF-151 will likely have a significant impact on the pirates operating out of Somalia.

In the coming days, MaritimeSecurity.com will be bringing you an in-depth look at the region, with a specific focus on Somalia. As we continue our site upgrade, please take advantage of the external links in reference to Somalia and piracy.